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CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PRAGMATISM AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
James Bolner*
The contemporary United States Supreme Court seems to deal
more and more in adjudication which has less and less to do with the
constitutional text. None would deny, of course, that the Court has
engaged in spinning constitutional elaborations and refinements from
the beginning. During the years of the Warren Court and, thus far,
the Burger era, we have seen the creation of a large number of consti-
tutional guarantees which are only tangentially related to any provi-
sions of the Constitution. The right to privacy,' to travel,' to beget
children,3 to abort unborn children,' and all rights encompassed in
the phrase "the necessities of life," 5 have either been held to be con-
stitutional rights by the Court or nominated for that status by some
of the Justices. These rights, often called "penumbral" rights,, are
more properly described as rights created by judicial fiat. In charac-
teristically Anglo-American fashion their creation has been in re-
sponse to specific problems and without the benefit of an articulated
body of principles, rules, or standards.
Although scholars have devoted considerable energy to the ques-
tion of "neutral principles,"7 viewing the Supreme Court's decision-
making as a major manifestation of American pragmatism makes
understanding of constitutional development more meaningful. The
Court's inconsistent treatment of fundamental constitutional rights,
* Professor of Political Science, Louisiana State University. The author wishes to
thank Mr. Richard House for his editorial assistance.
1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
5. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
6. Perhaps a plausible, though curious source of the concept of a constitutional
penumbra is Justice Holmes' statement in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241
(1926) (dissenting opinion): "But the law allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes
beyond the outline of its object in order that the object may be secured."
7. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 1 (1971); Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE
L.J. 571 (1948); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some In-
tersection Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Miller &
Howell,. The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 661
(1960); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAlv. L. REV.
1(1959).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
especially in the area of the so-called "new equal protection,"' is best
understood as the results of the Justices' efforts to adjust American
law to the political and economic realities as they have perceived
them.
THE PRAGMATISM OF MARSHALL AND OTHER GREAT LAWGIVERS
Our ancestors are venerated for their pragmatism. The grand
patron of American constitutional jurisprudence, Chief Justice John
Marshall, is, quite appropriately, also the patron of constitutional
pragmatism. Finding it expedient to give the Constitution a narrow
construction in Marbury v. Madison,' Marshall went on to espouse a
broad construction in such classics as McCulloch v. Maryland" and
Gibbons v. Ogden." The key to understanding all this is not that a
broad construction reflected a sober maturity of views, but that each
conflicting approach to the Constitution was suited to the occasion.
In Barron v. Baltimore, the Marshall Court decided that the states
were not bound by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. True, there
were sound arguments based on constitutional text and history favor-
ing Marshall's conclusion. However, in other circumstances, Mar-
shall did not hesitate to strain the constitutional text to reach the
desired result. For example, in interpreting the contract clause, the
early Court held that the Constitution contemplated corporate chart-
ers as contracts (even when "inherited" from the British Crown) and
that state legislative enactments were tantamount to contracts, 3 de-
spite a constitutional history which clearly indicated that the con-
tract clause reached only laws impairing obligations of contract be-
8. "New equal protection" refers to the post-New Deal use of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment as a constitutional standard for the review of
substantive public policies. Used in this sense the equal protection clause plays the
same role the due process clause played during the years of so-called "substantive due
process." The "new equal protection" differs from the traditional or "old" equal pro-
tection in that under the traditional test legislation was upheld if the Justices dis-
cerned a "rational basis" for it; the new test is triggered by the legislative use of a
"suspect classification" which warrants "strict scrutiny" and which can only be justi-
fied by "compelling state interests." For criticism of the "new equal protection," see
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee,
62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1093-94 (1974).
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
12. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
13. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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tween private parties. Marshall's goal was to interpret the contract
clause so as to protect private property. Although the Justice seemed
capable of turning the Constitution on its head in the cause of con-
servative politics, those politics did not include radical departures
from the text on behalf of fundamental human rights. Thus, in
Barron the private citizen could find no protection from the power of
the state in the Bill of Rights.
Following the Civil War, the supposed instrument for protecting
the person against the power of the state was the fourteenth amend-
ment. Yet, while property received protection as soon as the nation
had recovered from the trauma of the War, developing constitutional
protection for the person has been markedly painful and drawn-out.
In 1897, the Court held that the essence of the guarantee of the fifth
amendment dealing with just compensation for property taken for
public use was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 4 The Court during the same general period held that
numerous guarantees spelled out just as clearly in the Bill of Rights
did not apply against the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Closer scrutiny reveals that even supposed advances in personal
rights found their underpinnings in protection of property rights. For
example, in Meyer v. Nebraska'5 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'" the
Court extolled the "natural right" of parents to determine the educa-
tion of their children free of state interference. However, it can be
argued that the Court's real motive was to strike another blow at
state power which arguably encroached upon the business of running
private schools.
Yet, times were changing, and social realities could not permit
the Court to continue to be the economic arbiter. Thus, a new voice
of pragmatism arose on the Court. The critique addressed by Justice
Holmes (before the advent of the free speech controversy) to his
Spencerean brethren of the Court is by now a well-worn tale: do not,
urged Holmes, declare laws unconstitutional merely because they are
patently unwise or foolish; invalidate only those laws which lack the
endorsement of "a reasonable man.' 7 When called upon to explain
why the right to operate a pharmacy, 8 or serve as an undertaker" can
14. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963).
15. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
16. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
17. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928), overruled in North Dakota Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 411 U.S. 947 (1973).
19. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
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be suppressed in the community interest, Holmes and his disciples
contend that insofar as property rights are concerned, due process is
satisfied if the form of law is observed. Courts may not look to the
rationale underlying the law; or, if they do look, they must limit their
scrutiny to see whether or not there is any basis whatsoever which
would appeal to a "reasonable man," that is, any shred of plausibility
will do. As the progressivism of Holmes' day was culminated by the
New Deal, this pragmatic approach, aided by the infusion of new
Justices on the Court, became accepted doctrine.2 0
The triumph of the Holmesian doctrine is reflected in Justice
Black's succinct statement of the current approach:
This Court beginning at least as early as 1934. . .has consciously
returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle
that states have power to legislate against what are found to be
injurious practices in their internal commercial and business af-
fairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal
constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law ...
Under this constitutional doctrine the due process clause is no
longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state
legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to sup-
press business and industrial conditions which they regard as
offensive to the public welfare.2
1
These developments paralleled the Court's interpretation of the
equal protection clause. From the Old Court emerged the version of
equal protection teaching that the clause does not impose impossible
demands upon the state in the area of economic regulation. The
classic statement of this legacy is found in the recent case of
Dandridge v. Williams,22 where the Court found that states could
limit Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) funds to a
maximum amount per family regardless of size or need. The Court
declared:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
20. See, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1973)
(upholding state tax with differing rates for corporations and individuals); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (upholding state law requiring only certain
businesses to close on Sundays); Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89
(1955) (sustaining regulation of opticians while exempting vendors of ready-to-wear
eyeglasses).
21. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536-37 (1949).
22. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
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violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifi-
cations made by its laws are imperfect. . . 'The problems of gov-
ernment are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,
rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific.' 3
Thus the Court abandoned its role, on both the equal protection and
due process fronts, as the arbiter of state economic regulation.
Almost simultaneously with its renunciation of its economic ar-
biter role, the Court began in earnest its career as the creator of
fundamental personal rights. When the New Deal Court considered
the question of whether or not the double jeopardy guarantee applied
against the states,' 4 Justice Cardozo catalogued certain other consti-
tutional claims which had been upheld against state laws:2 1 freedom
of speech 6 and press," free exercise of religion, 8 peaceable assem-
bly,2 and the right of criminal defendants to the benefit of counsel.
In these and other situations immunities that are valid as
against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of
particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, become valid as against the states.2 '
Cardozo cited other rulings in which the Court had held guarantees
of the Bill of Rights not to apply to the states:32 grand jury indict-
ment,3 the privilege against self-incrimination, 3 the right to jury
23. 397 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted).
24. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
25. Id. at 324, 327.
26. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
27. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936).
28. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
29. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
30. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
31. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937). Cardozo also indicated the
opposite of a standard amenable to mechanical application: "Right-minded men ...
could reasonably, even if mistakenly, believe that a second trial was lawful in prosecu-
tions subject to the Fifth Amendment, if it was all in the same case. Even more plainly,
right-minded men could reasonably believe that in espousing that conclusion they were
not favoring a practice repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Id. at 323. See also
Cardozo's treatment of those immunities "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934).
32. 302 U.S. at 323, 324.
33. Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884).
34. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97 (1934); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1905).
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trial in criminal" and civil cases.3" In addition, the Court had indi-
cated, wrote Cardozo, that neither the fourth37 nor the fifth38 amend-
ments applied to the states.
Justice Cardozo's Palko criterion of those guarantees "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" is characteristically American;"9 it
settled nothing, clarified nothing, but it offered a gentle hope that the
problem of defining fundamental rights was manageable. Moreover,
it promised to be guided by circumstances in the future as in the past.
The phrase "life of ordered liberty" is no clearer than "life consistent
with the American dream." Yet this is the standard whereby funda-
mental rights have been defined. The story of the post-New Deal
acceleration of the process of incorporation is a familiar one and will
not be recounted here."0 In the numerous cases in which the theory
has been invoked to incorporate federally protected rights into the
fourteenth amendment, Cardozo's test was treated as pure rhetoric:
the key question has been whether or not a majority of Justices have
found plausible and convincing (one is tempted to say "compelling")
reasons of public policy to justify the inclusion or exclusion.
Similar considerations have governed the judicial development
of the several tests designed to justify the invalidation of measures
considered hostile to the freedom of expression. In 1919, Justice
Holmes introduced his unfortunate "clear and present danger" test
35. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
36. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
37. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 388 (1914).
38. West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904). Cardozo made no reference to O'Neil
v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), in which the Court had held the eighth amendment's
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment inapplicable to the states.
39. It is intriguing to compare the Cardozo standard with the more venerable one
put forward by Judge Washington in 1823. Referring to the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the several states, Washington wrote: "We feel no hesitation in confining
these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature funda-
mental; which belong of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have,
at all times, been enjoyed by citizens of the several states which compose this Union,
from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these funda-
mental principles are, it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the
government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject never-
theless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good
of the whole." Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823).
40. See Annot., 18 L.Ed. 2d 1388 (1967); Lacy, The Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment: the Evolution of the Absorption Doctrine, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
37 (1966).
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into the field of freedom of expression." Holmes almost immediately
disowned his own progeny" (though, to compound the confusion, not
outright) and with much assistance from Justice Brandeis proceeded
to modify it beyond recognition. The new Holmes-Brandeis clear and
present danger test merely placed freedom of expression in the same
class with pre-Holmesian property rights and claimed that those laws
which encroached on expression should be scrutinized and upheld
only when supported by convincing justifications.4 3 These efforts,
however, like the efforts to set off the freedoms of expression in a
special class of "preferred freedoms," dramatize the difficulties of
setting up some rights as more "fundamental" than others. Why
should the guarantees of the first amendment be the object of greater
solicitude than those of the fourth, fifth, sixth, or fourteenth amend-
ments? The theory advanced by Justice Stone in the Carolene
Products footnote 44-that regulatory laws aimed at property matters
are subject to repeal while laws aimed at suppressing expression
would be difficult, if not impossible, to repeal-fails to explain why
policies chilling the exercise of fourth amendment or fourteenth
amendment rights are not so strictly scrutinized. Although the
Holmes-Brandeis doctrine45 is now accepted as official dogma, the
rationale underlying the holding has not become any clearer; indeed,
one may argue that a dogmatic formula mechanically applied is no
better than ad hoc adjudication resting on no principle whatever."
As they wrestled with the problem of defining fundamental con-
stitutional rights, Cardozo and Holmes did so against the background
of a constitutional text. Recent decisions creating rights have gone
beyond the text, and this creates even greater problems. The Court
must now not only decide whether or not the right merits "incorpora-
tion," but whether or not it exists at all.
GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: A PRAGMATIC ADAPTATION OF THE RECENT
PAST
A logical point of departure in highlighting the Court's recent
career as a creator of constitutional rights" is Griswold v.
41. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
42. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
43. See particularly Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
44. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1944).
45. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
46. For an interesting treatment of the problem of ad hoc adjudication, see Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
47. For a concise chronology, see Gunther, supra note 8, at 8-12.
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Connecticut,'" where the court struck down a state law against the use
of contraceptives by invoking the "freedom to associate," the "right
of assembly," and the "right of belief." Justice Douglas was at pains
to point out that the Court was not invalidating the law on the basis
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause; to have done so
would have been bad form. Rather, the law was being voided on the
strength of precedents (Pierce, Meyer) and on the strength of post-
New Deal style civil liberties cases protective of the individual.
Griswold also marked a high point of the "strict scrutiny-
compelling interest" doctrine. In his concurring opinion, Justice
White explained the test:
The nature of the right invaded is pertinent, . . .for statutes
regulating sensitive areas of liberty do, under cases of this Court,
require 'strict scrutiny,' and 'must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.' 'Where
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the
State may prevail only by showing a subordinating interest which
is compelling."9
But to reach the conclusion that the anti-use statute was subject to
its strict scrutiny the Court had to find that a fundamental right had
been invaded. In doing so, Griswold illustrates still another trait of
the current approach toward fundamental freedoms: marked depar-
tures from the constitutional text.5" Caught in the spell of the new
jurisprudence, the Justices see constitutional guarantees as undimin-
ishable well-springs of rights. The prophet of the reach of the new
approach, and also on other occasions a chief ally, was Justice Black.
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights guarantee immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures but the "right to privacy" is not
explicitly mentioned. If "privacy" can be found in the interstices of
our organic law, where is one to stop? In Griswold, Justice Black
pointed out the overbreadth of this approach:
Brothers WHITE and GOLDBERG now apparently would start from
this requirement that laws be narrowly drafted so as not to curtail
free speech and assembly, and extend it limitlessly to require
States to justify any law restricting "liberty" as my Brethren
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1961).
49. Id. at 503-04.
50. Justice Brennan, for example, has declared: "The right to vote derives from
the right of association that is at the core of the First Amendment, protected from state
infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756
(1974).
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define "liberty." This would mean at the very least, I suppose,
that every state criminal statute-since it must inevitably curtail
"liberty" to some extent-would be suspect, and would have to
be justified to this Court.'
Black accurately described the touchstone of the new approach: de-
sirability of having laws "narrowly drafted so as not to curtail" the
rights in question, combined with the notion that states will be called
upon to justify any restrictive law which impinges upon what a ma-
jority of the Court considers "liberty." When the Court later found
the right to an abortion to be a fundamental one, Black's ad
horrendum reference to criminal laws was borne out. As to non-
criminal statutes, the Court has made use of the "right to travel" to
undermine minimum residence requirements set by the states for
welfare recipients,52 voting," and free, non-emergency medical care
for indigents.4 However, if the Court finds a statute to be less oppro-
brious, even if it involves a right considered fundamental the Court
will strive to save it.
The formula recited by Justice White in the 1974 case of
American Party of Texas v. White's serves well to illustrate the state
of the art. The case featured an unsuccessful challenge to Texas'
complex of regulations governing nominations of candidates for pub-
lic offices. Said Justice White:
[T]he foregoing limitations, whether considered alone or in
combination, are constitutionally valid measures, reasonably
taken in pursuit of vital state objectives that cannot be served
equally well in significantly less burdensome ways. 6
Thus, the key question becomes: do a significant number of Justices
think that the legislature can do better?
BEYOND GRISWOLD: FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS ENLARGED AND
CONTRACTED
Since Griswold, three major decisions dramatize the Supreme
Court's pragmatic treatment of fundamental rights, a treatment
51. 381 U.S. at 517-18.
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
53. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
54. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
55. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
56. Id. at 781. Other electoral system cases are Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968), Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) and Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
which may indeed be characterized as contradictory and inconsis-
tent. The cases concern travel, 7 equal education," and abortion."
Shapiro
Before Shapiro v. Thompson"0 was decided in 1969 the Court had
already interpreted the equal protection clause to reach state classifi-
cations resting on "suspect" criteria (other than race) and state laws
impinging upon "fundamental rights" had to be justified by some
"compelling" governmental interest. 1 Shapiro, however, marked a
new dimension of constitutional activism, for it literally invited
wholesale court challenges to any and all public policies. Shapiro held
that the equal protection clause prohibits states"2 from creating "two
classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other
except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or
more, and the second of residents who had resided less than a year,
in the jurisdiction." 3 Justice Brennan, in an opinion supported by
five colleagues, claimed that the policies were "irrational and uncon-
stitutional" 4 even under the traditional equal protection test, but
that the traditional tests did not apply since the cases involved the
fundamental right of interstate movement.
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia con-
tended that their policy of limiting welfare benefits was not only
sanctioned by Congress (indeed, made by Congress, for the District
of Columbia) but served to preserve the fiscal integrity of the pro-
grams, facilitate planning, provide an objective test of residency,
reduce fraud, and give new residents an incentive to make an early
entry into the labor force. Fiscal integrity, wrote Justice Brennan,
was not a "constitutionally permissible state objective";" and the
57. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
58. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
60. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
61. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). For cases since 1969 see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973); Sugarman v. McDougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 453 U.S.
365 (1971). Significant cases involving racial classifications are Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Bolting v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
498 (1954).
62. The fifth amendment'sdue process clause was held to encompass an equal
protection element in Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 498 (1954).
63. 394 U.S. at 627.
64. Id. at 638.
65. Id. at 633.
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other rationales were dismissed under the traditional equal protec-
tion standard of classification according to a reasonable basis." The
Court did not stop there but went on to hold:
[T]he traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since
the classification here touches on the fundamental right of inter-
state movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the
stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state inter-
est. Under this standard, the waiting period requirement clearly
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 7
The only obstacle left remaining in the Court's path was a federal
statute specifically authorizing state residence requirements of up to
one year. Justice Brennan dealt with it by a deft re-writing of the
legislative history and by declaring that even if the constitutional
question were presented "the provision, insofar as it permits the one-
year waiting-period requirement, would be unconstitutional.""
Thus, once created, a fundamental right seemingly cannot be
thwarted by policy reasons advanced by the state. A compelling state
interest is most often an unreachable goal. In creating fundamental
rights, an alarming degree of flexibility and, therefore, power over
public policy is left in the hands of the Justices. Since whether or not
a claim for legal protection is held to be a constitutional right at all
and, if so held, whether or not that right is "fundamental" are open
for judicial determination, the Justices literally hold the future of the
immediate shape of human rights of Americans in their hands. The
Court conceivably could prune away most of the implementing corol-
laries of our constitutional guarantees merely by redefining them as
"non-fundamental." Moreover, the confusion that has abounded as
the Court searches for a standard defining fundamental rights has
done nothing to allay these fears.
Roe and Doe
The 1973 abortion cases" dramatize the ease with which the
Justices may fashion fundamental rights. In such a controversial
area, it is possible that what looks like progress in the eyes of some
will look like retrogression to others. The heart of the Court's opinion
in the abortion cases attributes to the pregnant mother the same
66. Id. at 638.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 641.
69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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"right to privacy" discovered in Griswold. Departing even further
from the constitutional text, the Court finds that the right to privacy
is not only implied by the Constitution but that it can be used to
overturn longstanding prohibitions against abortion:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court deter-
mined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 0
Declaring the right to an abortion to be fundamental, the Court
easily dismissed any state justifications of abortion laws. These laws
are somehow said to be suspect because "a woman enjoyed a substan-
tially broader right to terminate a pregnancy" in the late 1790's "than
she does in most States today."' Finally, the American Medical As-
sociation, and the American Bar Association had taken positions
sanctioning abortions."
Justice Blackmun cites three reasons underlying the 19th cen-
tury abortion laws: 3 discouragement of illicit sexual conduct, concern
with abortion as a medical procedure, and the state's interest in
"prenatal life." The first reason was never taken seriously, says the
Court, and advances in medical science have undermined the validity
of the second reason; as to the third reason, the Court suggests that
the laws were motivated by a desire to protect the life and health of
the mother and did not explicitly endorse the theory that life begins
at conception.
The right to abortion, however, is not absolute and can be lim-
ited in the interest of protecting the mother's health, maintaining
medical standards, and preserving prenatal life. Thus, the question
is one to be decided by balancing the right to privacy and the "com-
pelling interests" asserted by the state. Although recognizing that the
interests in health authorize increasing state interference with the
woman's decision as the pregnancy progresses, the interest in preserv-
ing prenatal life is undercut by the Court's announcement that "per-
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The Court explained how a woman's
right to privacy is infringed by pointing to the medical and psychological harm to the
pregnant woman and the problems associated with the unwanted child that could
result from a denial of a choice to abort. Id.
71. Id. at 140.
72. Id. at 141-47.
73. Id. at 147-51.
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son" in the fourteenth amendment "does not include the unborn."',
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun attributes to the unborn a potential
for human life, and explains that the state may safeguard this entity
along with the health of the mother."5 In other words, the "pregnant
woman cannot be isolated in her privacy," 6 and given the considera-
tions of maternal health "any right of privacy she possesses must be
measured accordingly."7 7
In closing, Justice Blackmun draws a distinction between the
"health of the mother" factor and the "potentiality of human life"
factor. "Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term
and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling.' "
Since "mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal
childbirth, 79 the state may regulate abortion with a view toward
protecting the health of the mother only after the first three months
of pregnancy. Prior to this time the decision to abort is strictly be-
tween the woman and her physician. The state's interest in the poten-
tiality of human life cannot be asserted prior to viability, which is
defined as that point when "the fetus. . .has the capability of mean-
ingful life outside the mother's womb."8
The Court in Roe further elaborates and refines the nebulous
right of privacy, sorting out conflicting views to arrive at what can
only be described as a legislative enactment. Not only does the Court
continue to label rights as fundamental and interests as compelling,
but enlarges upon its new-found role by specifying at which point a
state interest "grows" to be compelling. Although Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton have been applauded by many as a landmark in our
74. Id. at 157. This view is understandably essential to the majority's ruling, but
nowhere does the Court explain how a person is to become a person if life is snuffed
out before birth. Curiously, after enumerating all the instances in the Constitution in
which the word "person" is used, Blackmun concludes: "But in nearly all these instan-
ces, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally." Id. (Emphasis
supplied.)
75. Id. at 162-63.
76. Id. at 159.
77. Id. But to act to protect the potential person the state must know something
of when life begins and on this point Justice Blackmun reports "wide divergence of
thinking." Id. at 160. A review of this divergence of thought leads him to the following:
"In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense." Id. at 162.
78. Id. at 162-63.
79. Id. at 163.
80. Id. The Court points out, however, that the state is not constitutionally com-
pelled to protect either the mother's health after the first trimester or fetal life after
viability. Id.
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evolving law of civil liberties,"' they do not seem to depart from the
Court's pragmatic stance, nor do they affect any basic changes in the
prevailing social and economic order."
Rodriguez
The Court which creates rights by judicial fiat has little com-
punction in limiting the scope of these rights. This principle has been
the lesson of cases holding that certain newly-minted rights of crimi-
nal defendants have only prospective application (and often with a
dizzying variety of degrees of prospectivity). 1 Can the Court, how-
ever, de-classify a right from the "fundamental" to the "non-
fundamental" class? Yes, indeed, responded the Court in San Anto-
nio School District v. Rodriguez,84 as it found that the right to an
equal education was, after all, not fundamental.5 The problem in
Rodriguez was this: a child attending one Texas public school was the
beneficiary of $356 spent per year on his education; another child
residing in another district in Texas received a public education cost-
ing $594 .1 The difference in expenditures was a function of the state's
legal provision tying the amount spent in each district to the money
raised by local ad valorem property taxation. The wealthy district
could raise a sizeable sum by taxing at a relatively low rate; the poor
district could not match this sum even with higher tax rates, simply
because it did not have the wealth to tax. The Court held that the
differential treatment at the hands of the state was no violation of
the equal protection clause, simply ruling that the right to an equal
education was not a fundamental right.
Education is not a right constitutionally provided for, argued
81. See Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 BOSTON U. L. REV. 765 (1973); Rubin, The Abortion Cases: A Study in Law
and Social Change, 5 N. C. CENT. L. J. 215 (1974). Compare Epstein, Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
82. See the discussion of the abortion movement by the American Medical Asso-
ciation and others, supra note 72, and accompanying text.
83. See the wide-ranging discussion among the Justices in Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
84. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
85. The Court had seemed to place education in the "fundamental right" category
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd.
of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). However, the school deseg-
regation cases were distinguished because they were decided in "the context of racial
discrimination." 411 U.S. at 29.
86. 411 U.S. at 12-13.
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Justice Powell for the Court, and neither is there "any basis for saying
it is implicitly so protected.""7 Wrote Powell: "As we have said, the
undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court
to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and
economic legislation."88 Rodriguez' argument that education was es-
sential to give meaning to his first and fifteenth amendment rights
was handled by saying that "the most effective speech or the most
informed electoral choice" though "desirable" were "not values to be
implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state ac-
tivities."" One would have thought that the right to an equal educa-
tion was of equal constitutional stature as the right to receive welfare
payments without fulfilling residency requirements. Indeed, Justice
Brennan had said in Shapiro:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the
fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to
limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public edu-
cation, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish
such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its
citizens. It could not, for example, reduce expenditures for educa-
tion by barring indigent children from its schools. 8
Even if education was not a fundamental right, was not wealth
a "suspect" classification requiring the Court to apply the strict scru-
tiny test? Justice Powell explained that the case was an inappropriate
occasion to apply the strict scrutiny test since each of the previous
cases in which the test had been applied "involved legislation which
'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some
such fundamental personal right or liberty."'" The Texas system was
different, he claimed, because the thrust of the state's plan was "af-
firmative and reformatory."" Previous cases treating wealth as a sus-
pect classification, declared Powell, involved persons who were "com-
pletely unable to pay for some denied benefit" and who "sustained
an absolute deprivation" of the benefit involved. 3 Next, the Court
declared that "there is no basis on the record in this case for assuming
that the poorest people-defined by reference to any level of absolute
87. Id. at 35.
88. Id.
89.' Id. at 36.
90. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
91. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973).
92. Id. at 39.
93. Id. at 19.
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impecunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts."" The opinion
does not deny that there is a correlation between "district property
wealth and expenditures,"" but it prefaces this concession with an
elaborate statement that most districts spending next to the most
money on education were inhabited by families with the next to
lowest median family incomes, while districts with the lowest ex-
penditures were inhabited by families with the highest median family
incomes. The litigation, however, focused on property wealth as a
basis for classification and not income wealth; education programs
were financed through property taxation and not income taxation;
the Court's reliance on income data is thus less than convincing.
In disposing of the suspect classification question, the Court
added that the "suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting
scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a
large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common
factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth
than other districts."" According to the standards applied in this
case, involving the definition of "classes" and the Court's lack of
"expertise" in implementing judgments, the Court has laid an ade-
quate foundation for a retreat from the Warren Court's rulings on
racial discrimination in schools and reapportionment of electoral dis-
tricts.
Having found education to be something less than a fundamen-
tal right and wealth generally not to be a suspect criterion, the Court
took steps to make sure it was recognized as a genuinely conservative
body. The Court exalted those cases limiting the theory of Shapiro
and stressed the problems involved in judicial resolution of signifi-
cant issues. It was convenient for the majority opinion to repeat Jus-
tice Stewart's view in Shapiro (in a concurring opinion) that the
Court simply recognizes established rights and does not create new
ones.97 Much of the Powell opinion is devoted to underlining judicial
incompetence to deal with the outside world and to extolling the
virtues of local government. Instead of viewing the litigation as an
attempt to vindicate a constitutionally protected right, the Court
seemed to treat it as a mischievous plot to inject the Justices in the
day to day operation of the nation's schools.
A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the tradi-
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 27.
96. Id. at 28.
97. Id. at 33, 34.
[Vol. 35
LEGAL PRAGMATISM
tional standard of review, which requires only that the State's
system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate
state purposes. . . We have here nothing less than a direct
attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. . .. [Aippellees would have the
Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to
state legislatures. 8
A fascinating paragraph in the decision illuminates the Court's
true motives in Rodriguez:
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to
be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the
basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might
well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-
housed are among the most ineffective participants in the politi-
cal process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the
benefits of the First Amendment.9
There was no way, in other words, of telling where Rodriguez' de-
mands might lead us. To make good Rodriguez' claim to an equal
education would have required the Court to digapprove the marked
economic disparities underlying American society. It was not that
Rodriguez' claim was less than fundamental, but that it was too
fundamental. In short, the Court had run up against the historic
reality of the sanctity of property interests. It is one thing to enjoin a
state official who denies welfare payments to persons who have not
survived a year within the state, but quite another to enjoin the
perpetuation of the gross inequities prevailing from school district to
school district.
CONCLUSION
If Shapiro, Roe-Doe, and Rodriguez were all wrongly decided,
how do we explain the seeming inconsistency? Shapiro and Roe-Doe
struck down state legislation while Rodriguez upheld state policy.
But the Court's handling of these issues has an intelligent, under-
standable pattern: in Shapiro it was anxious to articulate a juridical
standard broader than the then-prevalent "reasonable basis" test;
striking down the welfare residence requirements was important doc-
trinally, but it hardly trenched upon the fundamentals of the Ameri-
98. Id. at 40.
99. Id. at 37.
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can status quo. Roe-Doe finds the Court cavalierly applying the
Shapiro approach to strike down state abortion laws-a move which
appears quite radical but which, after all, had been sanctioned by the
American Bar Association and the American Medical Association. In
other words, the Court treated the anti-abortion laws as legal dead-
wood which was ready to be expunged from the statute books. But
to have struck down the system challenged in Rodriguez would have
touched a raw nerve of our political economy, and the Court typically
declined an opportunity to effect basic change.
The discretion of the Court in delineating our fundamental rights
is alarming. One can only hope that since the Court engages in the
pragmatic creation of rights it will do so in a way consistent with the
community interest and the dignity of the individual.
